Company Size, Age and Innovation Activity in the Steel Industry. (Example of BOF Technology) by Maly, M.
Company Size, Age and Innovation 
Activity in the Steel Industry. 
(Example of BOF Technology)
Maly, M.
IIASA Working Paper
 
April 1987
Maly, M. (1987) Company Size, Age and Innovation Activity in the Steel Industry. (Example of BOF Technology). IIASA 
Working Paper. Copyright © 1987 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/3016/ 
Working Papers on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
W O R K I I G  PAPER 
COMPANY SIZE, AGE XD INNWATION ACTIVITY 
I N  THE STEEL INDUSTRY 
( E m m p l e  of BOF Techno logy)  
M i l a n  Maly 
A p r i l  1987 
WP-87-036 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  
for Applied Systems Analysis 
NOT FOR QUOTATION 
WITHOUT PERMISSION 
OF THE AUTHOR 
COMPANY SIZE, AGE AND INNOVATION ACTIVITY 
IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY 
(Example o f  BOF Technology) 
Milan Maly 
April 1987 
WP-87-36 
Working Papers are interim reports on work of the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Ana- 
lysis and have received only limited review. Views 
or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily 
represent those of the Institute or of its National 
Member Organizations. 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria 
FORWARD 
In an era of technology globalization, management appears to be 
one of the main factors influencing success in technological 
development. The flexibility and speed with which a company or 
country is able to identify and introduce new technologies appear 
to be the most important factors for its subsequent success. 
Today possibly more than ever, the characteristics of management 
and organization which enable a company to be innovative are 
claiming the attention of managers and politicians. No less 
important is a company's or country's flexibility in exploring 
and developing already-introduced technolcgies. 
The possibility of describing the process of technology substitu- 
tion through logistic functions is one method of forecasting 
future development of a technological species and one which is 
not yet fully utilized in practice. The management implications 
of the life cycle concept appear to be very important for man- 
agerial practice, but this is a tool which has not yet been fully 
adapted to managerial needs. 
The study and analysis of management dynamics along the different 
phases of the life cycle can make possible the definition of dif- 
ferent management applications of the life cycle concept. Based 
on this, useful conclusions can be drawn for decision-makers. 
Size is one possible characteristic to describe organizational 
status and management, and the dynamics of size during different 
phases of the life cycle can indicate the innovative capabilities 
of small-, medium- and large-scale industries. This is the main 
objective of the study presented, which in constrast to prior 
studies, concentrates on two new aspects: new methods of cluster- 
ing firms and, based on this, analysis of the role of firm size 
and age in different phases of the life cycle of BOF technology. 
Evka Razvigorova 
MTL Principal Investigator 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1986, a new program called "Technology, Economy, Society" was 
launched at IIASA. This very ambitious program consists of sev- 
eral projects and activities. One of these is "Management and 
the Technological Life Cycle" (MTL), whose main objectives are to 
determine the possibilities of long-term management planning, 
organizational changes, and increased organizational flexibility 
which will facilitate the introduction and development of new 
technologies. 
The first field of MTL's research is the steel industry, and the 
concrete topic of basic oxygen technology (BOF) was selected as 
an example of the latest major innovation in steel manufacturing. 
A few studies have been carried out previously in this area. For 
example, Lynn (1982) studied the problem as a comparison between 
the way Japan and the U.S. adopted BOF. Buzacott (1980) carried 
out a study regarding the adoption of BOF at Canadian steel com- 
panies. Martino (1978) described the diffusion history of BOF in 
the IJSA, and Meyer and Herregat (1974) conducted a detailed study 
of the diffusion of the basic oxygen process on a global scale, 
reaching two main conclusions. First, they found that most of the 
differences between firms, and perhaps to an even greater extent 
between national industries, could be explained by objective 
differences in the economic environment in which these firms or 
industries operate. Secondly, they also determined that some of 
the differences observed between firms or national industries are 
attributable to such non-economic factors as differences in man- 
agement styles and motivation. 
Ray (1984) studied the diffusion of BOF mainly during the period 
between 1969-1981, and stated that BOF approached maturity in the 
late 1960's and has now practically displaced all other tech- 
nologies with the exception of electric steelmaking. 
Rosegger ( 1980) analysed the reasons for the delayed introduction 
of BOF into U.S. companies. 
Poznanski (1986) analyzed the process involved in the decline of 
technologies in the world's steel industry and investigated the 
basic patterns through which the technologies are phased out once 
they become obsolete. 
Part of this MTL activity has involved analyzing the role of 
company size and age as important organizational attributes in 
the area of strategic management, especially innovation manage- 
ment. The main objective of our current study is to specify the 
role of company size as a factor of time, where time is repre- 
sented by the phases of the technological life cycle. The new 
elements in this study are the global worldwide viewpoint and the 
usage of the technological life cycle concept. Moreover, a new 
methodological access for dividing companies into groups has been 
developed. The study, being an inherent part of the MTL activity, 
is based on that activity's data base and some of its empirical 
and theoretical findings. 
2. STATE-OF-THE-ART 
There is a general impression among the public that small, young 
companies are more innovative than larger, older ones. The number 
of researchers studying the relationship between company size and 
innovation ability is very high.' 
The notion that small, young companies are more innovative is far 
from unambiguous, but many authors are in agreement on the sub- 
ject." According to Bracker and Pearson, the entrepreneurial 
spirit housed in its small firms is perhaps the greatest advantage 
the U.S. has in the highly competitive world marketplace, while 
entrepreneurs are rarely found in large, mature industries. 
Schollhammer and Kuriloff (1979) are of the same opinion when 
they say that the natural habitat of entrepreneurs is small busi- 
ness. Siropolis (1977) states that small firms innovate while 
others are content to sit on their hands. Granstrand (1982) 
mentions that large and/or old industrial organizations are com- 
monly thought of as hampering creative and innovative work. 
But not only Western specialists stress that small, young firms 
are more innovative. Many researchers from Eastern countries 
agree.g One of the main features of the most recent Hungarian 
economic reform is the idea of increasing the number of small 
enterprises and companies in the Hungarian national economy.". 
On the other hand, many authorsg cite examples where large com- 
panies seem more innovative. 
'Freeman (1971), Johnnisson/LindstrGm (1971), Gold (1981), 
Scherer (1965), Smyth (1972), DeWoot (1977/78), Wilson (1766), 
Kuhn (1985), Sounder (1983), Buzacott (1980), Kleine (1980), 
Stroetmann (1979), Rothwell/Zegveld (1982), NystrSm/Edvardsson 
(1978), Acs/Audretsch (1986), etc. 
zsSiropolis (1977), Bracker/Pearson (1986), Schollhammer/Kuri- 
loff (1979), Rothwell/Zegveld (1982), Freeman (1971), NystrGm/Ed- 
vardsson ( 1978) . 
"'Tragsdorf, 1985; Remes, 1984; etc. 
"Baark/Qnxian (1985), Patrick/Rosovsky (1976), Maitland 
(1982), Kleine (1980). 
Baark and Anxian (1985) mention the example of Swedish engineering 
companies, the diffusion of NC, IR and CAD/CAM. As a comparison 
of the'different diffusion patterns of CIM shows, the more ad- 
vanced the technology and the more factors involved, the more 
difficult the diffusion. Many companies, especially small and 
medium-sized ones, lack both the financial and technical base for 
adopting such technology in its early stages. The role of large 
companies depends to a great extent on their ability to realize 
that technical and commercial success requires more than simply 
producing high-quality machines and components. I t  is vital to 
combine them and adapt them to each other, thereby forming com- 
plete equipment systems and satisfying customers' needs. Because 
of this, many large Swedish engineering companies have decided to 
develop a very wide range of technically superior products, in an 
effort to develop a high level of engineering know-how in a great 
variety of fields. 
Patrick and Rosovsky (1976) feel that the agents of Japan's rapid 
advances in technical knowledge and its remarkable economic growth 
have been the country's larger firms. Maitland (1982) comes to 
more or less the same conclusion: that large Japanese enterprises 
have an astonishing record of innovation. 
Kleine (1980) analyzes innovation activity through the number of 
patents owned in companies of different sizes and concludes that 
medium and large companies are more innovative as compared with 
sma 1 1 er ones. 
This view is supported by the hypothesis of Kamien and Schwarz 
(1982) that large firms tend to be proportionally more innovative 
than small firms. 
A further third group of researchersh feel the problem of deter- 
mining which size of firm (small, medium or large) is most innova- 
tive is much more difficult to resolve. 
Ayres (1986) finds it fairly clear that the simple inversive 
relationship between innovation and firm size is not generally 
true. Wilson (1966) proposed a partial theory about the relation- 
ship between organizational structure and innovation, the hypo- 
thesis being that the effects of greater organizational diversity 
are contradictory, stimulating an organization's capacity to gen- 
erate innovative proposals while inhibiting the capacity to adopt 
and implement them. Wilson concludes that this may explain why 
the evidence on this issue is inconclusive. 
&Ayres (1986); Wilson (1966), Acs/Audretsch (1986), Maly/- 
Zaruba (1986), Smrcka (1985). 
Acs & Audretsch (1986) analyzed innovation rates at large and 
small firms for 247 four-digit SIC industries and came to the 
conclusion that innovation activity for large firms responds to a 
different market environment than innovation activity for small 
firms. 
After studying the diffusion of mature technologies, Ray (1984) 
came to the conclusion that size has less to do with the diffusion 
of new technologies in the mature phase than was believed some 10 
or 20 years ago. 
At the workshop, "Size and Productive Efficiency: The Wider 
Implications," held at IIASA in June, 1979, one of the major 
topics of discussion was the relationship between scale and in- 
novation, in particular the way in which the development and 
adoption of innovations are influenced by the size of the firm. 
Qne result was that an optimum organization size exists for major 
process innovations: not so small that a diversity of managerial 
experience is lacking and not so large that there is rigid bureau- 
cracy and lack of common purpose. 
This review of state-of-the-art research on the issue demonstrates 
a wide diversity of opinion among researchers. We hypothesize 
that the optimal company size from the point of view of innovative 
activity depends on many factors (industry, technological life 
cycle phase, country size, country's industrial structure, etc.) 
and changes according to these factors. From this viewpoint, we 
cannot speak of an optimal size in general, but only of an optimal 
size under specified conditions. We must consider the fact that 
the optimal size is changing over time in conjunction with the 
changing critical factors. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
Solving the objectives outlined above involves a number of metho- 
dological issues. The first problem is how to specify company 
size. A great number of authors are looking into the problem of 
company size and scale,7 mainly from the point of view of the 
relationship between company size and economies of scale. 
Despite the large number of studies, a conceptual definition 
regarding size and scale had been lacking for a long time. In 
1981, Gold defined scale "as the level of planned production 
capacity which determines the extent to which specialization has 
been applied to the subdivision of the component tasks and faci- 
?Aldrich (1962), Blau (1962), Bolotnyi (1976), Buzacott/Cant- 
ley/Glagolev (1982), Gold (19811, Kimberley (1976), Miller (1978), 
Morodney (19691, Pugh/Hickson (1963), Silberston (19721, Stigler 
( 1976). 
lities of a unified operation." This definition makes it possible 
to differentiate between scale and size. Size refers to designed 
capacity and scale to planned production capacity, which can be 
increased for instance by utilizing higher levels of specializa- 
tion. 
Company (or enterprise or other organizational unit) size is 
measured by many different criteria, as one comprehensive crite- 
rion to specify size has not yet been agreed upon. These crite- 
ria can be divided into 3 main groups: 
+ company's material substance, 
* company input, 
+ company output. 
Material substance measurements would usually include the number 
of employees, the value of capital goods, and total capital. 
Input is expressed mainly by the consumption of raw materials or 
energy, and output by number of units/tons produced, gross out- 
put, etc. 
Usinq any one of these criteria has both strong and weak aspects. 
For example, the most wide-spread criterion is probably the number 
of employees, but difficulties arise with this in the case of 
automated production. Each criterion conveys different aspects of 
size. From that point of view, it is necessary when conducting a 
concrete analysis to select the criterion most appropriate for 
fulfilling the objectives of the analysis, in an effort to elimi- 
nate inconclusive results. 
The object of our study is the steel industry, namely BOF tech- 
nology. The most significant and comparable criterion in this 
case is the capacity of raw steel production per year. This 
criterion is usually used to indicate the size not only of a 
steel-mill plant, but of the entire integrated steel company as 
well. Moreover, the criterion is widely used in literature, 
statistics and reports as well as in articles and research papers. 
It is furthermore used in both planned and market economy coun- 
tries. 
Usinq the number of company employees is not acceptable, because 
of differences in production profiles, mainly of the rolling- 
mills, which greatly influence productivity and the required 
number of employees involved. Other material substance criteria, 
such as the value of capital goods or total capital, could be 
used, but are less suitable when taking into account not only 
Western, but also Eastern companies (where this data i s  not avail- 
able). Input criteria, such as consumption of raw materials or 
energy, are also not available in many cases. Output criteria, 
for instance total volume of raw steel production per year, is 
influenced by the level of capacity utilization. 
The second methodological issue is specifying the boundaries 
between groups of company size. Three groups are usually dis- 
tinguished in literature, official statistics and reports as 
small, medium and large companies." Puthors, however, use dif- 
ferent boundaries for the three groups. These boundaries depend 
on the object of the study under question: an entire industry, 
different branches of industry, or other branches of national 
economies (agriculture, transport, service, etc.). For instance, 
Nystrom & Edvardsson use the following boundaries for the farm 
machinery industry: small up to 9, medium between 10-50, and large 
over 50 employees. Hungarian industrial statistics use up to 
1500 employees for small, from 1501 to 4000 for medium, and over 
4000 for large. 
Statistics covering the steel industry usually use the following 
divisions: up to 500,000 tons of raw steel capacity per year for 
small companies, 500,000 to 1,500,000 tons for medium, and over 
1,500,000 tons for large. This division is also used in litera- 
ture.'? If we examine this more deeply, we must state that so far 
these boundaries have been established most subjectively and are 
hardly suitable for a detailed analysis. Our idea is to create 
more natural and homogeneous groups by means of suitable mathe- 
matical methods, in order to derive more statistically signifi- 
cant results. Figure 1 shows us the example of Swedish steel 
companies divided by the customary boundaries. At once, it is 
clearly visible that these boundaries do not create any natural, 
homogeneous groups. 
SUEDEN - SIZE OF STEEL CONPlNY - CRUDE STEEL UUTPUT 
(17 COHPANIES) Figure 1 
'3Nystr~m/Edvardsson !1978), Nabseth/Ray (1974), Tragsdorf 
(1985), Smrcka (1985), Remes (1984). 
ryNabseth & Ray, 1974. 
In our case, we used a new method for clustering points located 
on the line of real numbers, combining cluster analysis and his- 
togram as developed by S. Miyamoto (see Attachment 1). The method 
was not fully applied; it served only a s  a scientific framework 
for specifying the boundaries. 
After clustering the companies into more homogeneous groups, we 
come to the very difficult methodological problem of how to dis- 
tinguish the more innovative companies from the others. We are 
aware of the difficulties this task presents, but it is possible, 
however, to formulate the hypothesis that the more innovative 
companies are those who adopted a new technology or product in 
the early period following its first adoption globally. The next 
methodological question arises immediately: how to specify the 
"early period following its first adoption globally." 
To answer this question, we start from the premise that specify- 
ing such a period is possible by means of the theory of the tech- 
nological life cycle. This particular theory has been developed 
mainly by Rbernathy and Utterback (1975). Empirical evidence 
demonstrate that product and process technologies show a rather 
predictable pattern of dynamic behavior."" 
The typical S-shaped function is designed usually by means of the 
degree of penetration of technology as measured by market share, 
percentage of adoption, etc., expressed usually by annual capacity 
or output. We suggest designing the S-shaped curve by means of 
the share of the BOF early adopters to the total number of in- 
tegrated steel companies in the world. This is because we want 
to recognize the early adopters, the firms which adopted BOF 
during the early (i.e. take-off) phase of the technological life 
cycle. We try to eliminate the cases when these same firms 
adopted BOF later on at other plants. 
For calculation, we used the simple Fisher and Pry mode1:"l 
Equation 1. 
The curve is symmetrical, b(t) = b = constant, and point of in- 
flection f*(t) = 0.5; f(t) is the share of the early adopters of 
BOF to the total number of inegrated steel companies worldwide 
and c ,  b are the parameters defining the S-shape. 
""Ford/Ryan (1982), Pappas (1984), DeBresson & Lampel (1985). 
llFisher/Pry (1971). 
So far, we have not developed a exact method to help us define 
the boundaries between the consecutive phases of the technological 
life cycle. The literature regarding this particular problem is 
not very h e l p f ~ l . ~ ~  The only possibility at the moment is to 
specify the boundaries from some technological and economic in- 
dicators. The take-off phase measures the period during which 
the early adopters started to produce steel using BOF technology. 
The last, but perhaps the most important, issue is to what extent 
do we require a data base to resolve the issues. We must take 
into account not only our specific task, but also the availability 
of data. Because the steel industry is well documented in statis- 
tics and literature, we have decided to gather information from 
many countries around the world, bearing in mind that not all 
steel companies can adopt BOF. BOF technology can be adopted 
only by companies with certain technological prerequisites. This 
implies that we must restrict our attention to integrated steel 
plants (i.e., those with blast furnaces, steel mills, and rolling 
mills), and moreover exclude those integrated steel plants produc- 
ing only special grades of steel. In these instances, only elec- 
tric furnaces, not open hearth or BOF, would be preferred. 
The next question to arise is what year to take as a basis for 
the analysis of quantitative data. We suggested taking the year 
of BOF7s first commercial adoption as the basis for our analysis. 
To analyze the relationship between the age of a company and its 
innovativeness, it is not logical to use the same access (cluster 
analysis combined with histogram), because age is not dependent 
on a clustering of companies by age. Age must be taken as an 
independent factor. The only possibility is to divide time into 
regular periods and compare company results during these periods. 
4. FINDINGS 
The first commercial adoption of BOF technology was in 1952, when 
the first convertor came into operation at Voest, in Austria. 
From that point on, other steel companies had to include the 
option of adopting BOF into their strategic planning. 
The main source for our data base is Cordero's survey of Iron and 
Steel Works of the World for 1952. This book includes all major 
producers of iron, raw steel and rolled steel products as well as 
many other producers of re-rollers, tubes, iron powder, etc. 
Hundreds of companies were analyzed from this book in order to 
sel'ect the integrated steel companies, excluding those concentrat- 
ing their production exclusively on special grades of steel. 
lZThere are only a few hints on this topic in Ford & Ryan 
(1982), Cleland & King (1983), and Meffert (1980). 
The list of 74 companies (see Attachment 2) does not include all 
integrated steel companies worldwide, not only because of the 
traditional secrecy of the planned economy countries, but also 
because of secrecy policies in such countries as the United King- 
dom, and others, for which data was not available. By our esti- 
mation, about 100-120 integrated companies existed in the world 
in 1952, so our sample contains more than 60% of the total. 
W e  shall start our analysis using the standard classification of 
company size, i-e. up to 500,000 tons raw steel capacity per year 
for small; 500,000 to lr500,000 for medium; and over 1,500,000 
for large. Using these standard classifications, we obtain a 
division of integrated companies into groups shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 
The main sources for identifying the early adopters were Lynn 
(1982) and Stone (1966). The number of new firms adopting BOF 
worldwide by year from 1952-1970 is portrayed in Figure 2. 
Number 
Percentage 
NUMBER OF NEW FIRMS WORLDWIDE 
ADOPTING THE BOF BY YEAR, 
1952 - 1970 
YEAR NUMBER OF CUMULATIVE 
FIRMS NUMBER 
YEAR NUMBER OF CUMULATIVE 
FIRMS NUMBER 
Total 
74 
100 
Small 
26 
35 
Source :  L. L y n n  (1982); J. K .  S t o n e ,  (1966) 
Figure 2 
Med i urn 
3 1 
42 
Large 
17 
23 
From that data base, the life cycle curve was created by means of 
the cumulative number of firms adopting BOF every year. 
The estimated result of Equation 1 is as follows: 
In f(t) 
- t) = .321 * (year - 1952) - 4.22 (32.7) (40.8) 
D.W. = 1.06 
where the values in the parenthesis are t-values. 
Figure 3 shows the typical S-curve as a result of that sample, 
and Table 2 contains the actual value of the share of the early 
adopters to the total number of integrated firms and estimated 
value of that share. 
Sources: L. Lynn (1982) LL J.K. Stone (1966) CC) M. Maly. IIASA, 
Figure 3 
T a b l e  2 
YERR * O F  F C t >  EST1 nRTED TOTAL 
EHRLY f <t> I NTEGRRTEO 
HDOPTERS FIRMS 
= ~ ~ ~ 1 3 1 1 = 1 = n L P = l = ~ ~ = ~ ~ ~ ~ b b = = - a = = ~ c e e o e e e = ~ e = = a a ~ - = - - = = = ~ = - = ~ =  
The take-off phase (containing the early adopters) starts in 1952 
with the first commercial adoption of BOF and finishes in 1962 as 
specified from certain technological and economic indicators. 
Such a specification is supported by technological and economic 
indicators from literature. Meyer and Herregat (1974) came to the 
conclusion that by 1961 or 1962 all purely technological problems 
in adopting BOF had been solved and that all countries and firms 
were facing a homogeneous technology. Tchijov (1987) concluded 
that the boundary between the take-off phase and growth phase of 
different technological life cycles in the case of steel produc- 
tion might be defined as 9-10% of total production. BOF technol- 
ogy reached this ratio in 1962-1963 (Rosch, 1979). During that 
period (1952-1962), 29 firms adopted BOF. 
Figure 4 contains a list of the early adopters of BOF. 
FIRMS ADOPTING THE BOF, 
1952 - 1962 
FIRM COUNTRY DATE FIRM COUNTRY DATE 
Voest 
Alpine 
Dof asco 
McLouth 
Yawata 
Bochumer 
Belgo Nineir 
JSL 
Petrovsk i 
Koninklijke 
Nippon Kokan 
A 1 goma 
Kaiser 
Krivoh Rog 
Acme 
Austria 
Austria 
Canada 
U.S. 
Japan 
W. Germany 
Braz i 1 
U.S. 
U.S.S.R. 
Nether lands 
Japan 
Canada 
U.S. 
U.S.S.R. 
U.S. 
Hindustani 
Amagasak i 
Fuji 
Sumi tomo 
C.F.& I. 
S.A.R.L. 
Kobe 
Kawasa k i 
ATH 
Norsk 
US I NOR 
Richard Thomas 
National 
Broken Hill 
India 
Japan 
Japan 
Japan 
U. s. 
Portugal 
Japan 
Japan 
W. Germany 
Norway 
France 
U.K. 
U.S. 
Australia 
Source: L. Lynn (1982); J. K.  Stone (1966) 
Figure 4 
Using the standard classifications, we can divide the early adop- 
ters into groups as well. The only difficulty is that data on 
the size of all early adopters are not available. For that rea- 
son, we were able to consider only 20 companies (69%). The divi- 
sion of these companies is depicted in Table 3. 
Table 3 
When we compare the results from Tables 1 and 3, we can state 
that the division into small, medium, and large companies is 
almost the same. In the group of small companies the percentage 
(35%) is exactly the same, in the medium group slightly lower (35 
versus 42%), and in the large group, on the contrary, slightly 
higher (30 versus 23%). We can conclude that large companies 
were slightly more innovative than the medium and small companies. 
Studying the process of adopting BOF, we see that at the stage of 
early adoption, it is very easy to distinguish two main waves. 
The first lasted from 1952 to 1954, during which 4 companies 
adopted BOF. After that, there was a 2-year pause and then the 
Number 
Percentage 
Small 
7 
35 
Total 
20 
100 
Med i urn 
7 
35 
Large 
6 
30 
second wave from 1957-1962, during which 25 companies adopted 
this technology. The percentage of companies by size during 
these two waves is shown in Table 4. 
T a b l e  4 
From the results, we can see that the small and medium companies 
began adopting at the same rate (50%) in the first wave, and then 
were followed by all three groups at almost even rates, with a 
slight prevalence of the large companies. 
In the second step of our analysis, we shall use as an alterna- 
tive solution the method for clustering points located on the 
line of real numbers combining histogram and cluster analysis. 
# All E.A. 
Percentage 
# 1st Wave 
Percentage 
# 2nd Wave 
Percentage 
The computerized results depicted in Attachment 3 show us the 
clusters of companies by size. We have 20 clusters and from that 
can distinguish the differences in production capacity between 
them. Attachment 4, the histogram, gives us illustrative informa- 
tion about the density and breadth of the "valleys." Combining 
the results of both the cluster analysis and the histogram allows 
us to specify four main clusters (groups) of companies by size. 
Using round figures for particular zones, the boundaries of these 
groups are as follows: 
Large 
17 
23 
0 
0 
6 
38 
sma 1 1 : up to 999,999 tons 
medium: 1,000,000 to 1,999,999 tons 
large: 2,000,000 to 5,999,999 tons 
mammoth: 6,000,000 tons and over 
Total 
74 
100 
4 
100 
16 
100 
Small 
26 
35 
2 
50 
5 
31 
- 
We have to add that no exact mathematical method exists for spe- 
cifying the boundaries, but combining the cluster analysis with 
the histogram creates the scientific framework for rational expert 
specification of the boundaries. The first main factor is the 
breadth of the "valleys" (histogram); the magnitude of the dif- 
ferences between clusters is the second important factor. 
Med i um 
3 1 
42 
2 
50 
5 
3 1 
The reason why the breadth is more important than the differences 
in production capacity stems from the results of the cluster 
analysis. We see that the first clusters 1 2 3) with the 
greatest distances (16,700; 5900; 3499) each contain only one 
"mammoth" company. Such results are of no use to our analysis. 
The distance (breadth) between the mammoth size companies and the 
group of large companies is so large (8,600,000 to 5,101,000 
tons) that this in itself implies a homogeneous and natural group- 
ing, without a non-practical division into groups of one isolated 
mammoth company each. We specified the round figure of 6,000,000 
tons as the boundary betwwen mammoth and large companies. 
The next largest distance (breadth) is between 2,500,000 and 
3,700,000 tons (Cluster No. 4), but this distance is closer to 
the distances between companies from 3,700,000 and 5,100,000 tons 
that a more natural grouping is formed by including the company 
of 2,500,000 tons with the "large" company group. The third 
largest distance or breadth is found between 1,800,000 and 
2,500,000 (Cluster No. 5) and the round figure 2,000,000 tons 
within that interval creates the boundary between large and medium 
groups. 
Within the small/medium zone on the histogram, the widest valley 
is found between 700,000 and 1,000,000 tons. Comparing this with 
the cluster analysis, we use Cluster No. 13 between 900,000 and 
12000,000 tons, specifying the round figure of 1,000,000 tons as 
the boundary between the groups of small and medium companies 
(medium from 1,000,000 to 1,999,999 tons and small under 1,000,000 
tons). 
After specifying the boundaries of the groups, we can continue as 
in the first step, using the standard boundary classifications. 
The division of the 74 companies by size and of the 20 early 
adopters is depicted on Table 5. 
Table 5 
The results of Table 5 show us more distinctly that the group of 
large companies is almost twice as innovative as the groups of 
small and medium companies. On the other hand, the group of 
mammoth companies is completely non-innovative. 
SIZE 
Number 
Percentage 
# of E . A .  
% of E . A .  
Small 
42 
57 
10 
50 
Med i um 
23 
3 1 
7 
35 
Large 
6 
8 
3 
15 
Mammoth 
3 
4 
0 
0 
Total 
74 
100 
20 
100 
Analyzing the two main waves in the period of early adoption, we 
obtain the results depicted in Table 6. 
Table 6 
From the results of Table 6, we can again see more distinctly 
that the small companies started the adoption of BOF only later 
to be followed by medium and especially large companies, where 
the share was almost 2.5 times higher than the rate of the number 
of companies (19 versus 8%). 
From the results of this analysis, mainly from its second step, 
we conclude that from a global point of view all size groups, 
except mammoth, took part in the early process of adopting BOF. 
The relatively higher share was that of the large companies, but 
the process began with the small companies. 
SIZE 
All comp. 
Percentage 
# 1st Wave 
Percentage 
# 2nd Wave 
Percentage 
Looking at the problem of innovativeness by company size from a 
national point of view, we can analyze the countries for which 
data are available, i.e. Australia, Austria, Canada, USA, FRG, 
Brazil, Netherlands, Norway, France, and Japan. 
Small 
42 
5 7  
4 
100 
6 
37 
In Australia, only one company, Broken Hill, had the precondi- 
tions to adopt BOF and realized it. The firm is the country's 
largest steel company. 
Ned i um 
23 
3 1 
0 
0 
7 
4 4  
In Austria, we see that only two companies (Voest and Alpine) had 
the preconditions to adopt BOF, and both did. The firms have 
since merged and are Austria's largest steel entities. 
Mammoth 
3 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Large 
6 
8 
0 
0 
3 
19 
In Canada, four companies would have been able to adopt BOF. 
Only two or 50% actually did; the smallest (Dofasco) and the 
largest (Algoma). 
Total 
7 4  
100 
4 
100 
~ 
100 
In the USA, the situation is shown in Table 7 .  From a total of 20 
integrated steel companies, 6 or 30%IL3 adopted BOF early on. 
Table 7 
From this table, we see that the group of small companies is the 
most innovative (5% - 20%), followed by large companies (50%- 
60%). Only minor innovativeness is shown by the group of medium 
size companies (45% - 20%). 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, only one firm (A.T.H.) is 
considered2.'+ (about 12%). The firm is the smallest steel company 
in the country. 
Total 
20 
100 
5 
100 
In Brazil, only two firms had the possibility of adopting BOF; 
one, Belgo-Mineira, or 50% did in fact. From a global point of 
view, the firm is small, but it is Brazil's largest steel com- 
pany - 
< 
1nteg.Comp. 
Percentage 
Ear 1 y Adop . 
Percentage 
In the Netherlands, the only firm capable of adopting BOF did. 
Globally, i t  is also considered small, but it is the country's 
largest. 
Medium 
9 
45 
1 
20 
Small 
1 
5 
1 
20 
In Norway, the situation is the same. Only one firm was able to 
adopt BOF, it did, and is its country's largest. 
Large 
1 0  
50 
3 
60 
In France, three firms had the capability to adopt BOF. Only 
one, USINOR, did (33%). It is the second largest steel company 
in France; from a global point of view, a medium company. 
In Japan, the situation is very illustrative. Out of a total of 
5 companies,lg all belong to the group of early adopters. One 
company is small, two are medium, and two are large. 
13Data unavailable for Gcme Steel. 
lC'.Data unavailable from Bochumer. 
1:3Data unavai lab le from Sumi tom0 and Amagasak i . 
From this survey of 1 0  countries, we can state that in most of 
them, the early adopters were the largest steel companies from a 
national point of view (Austria, Australia, Brazil, Netherlands, 
Norway, France C2nd largest]). In one country, Canada, the early 
adopters were the smallest and the largest companies; in Japan, 
all integrated steel companies were early adopters. The only 
exceptions are the FRG, where the early adopter was a small com- 
pany and the USA where the percentage of small companies as early 
adopters is the highest. 
The next topic is the relationship between company age and innova- 
tiveness. From Attachment 2, we see that we do not have a great 
deal of data available. So the findings cannot be very sig- 
nificant statistically, and the results are assumed only to be 
illustrative of the situation. From the total of 74 companies, 
we know the year of establishment of 27. Fifteen are early adop- 
ters of BOF, i.e. over 50%. If we divide the time from the first 
adoption of BOF (1952) into 10-year periods backwards and analyze 
the data, we obtain the results depicted on Table 8. 
Table B 
1'352 1 9 4 2  1 9 3 2  1922 19 1 2  1 9 0 2  1 8 9 2  18Q2 TOTHL 
TO 1 9 4 3  TO 1 9 3 3  TO 1 9 2 3  TO 1 9 1 3  TO 1 9 0 3  TO 1893 TO 1883 TO 1 3 7 3  
1 P l l l l l l P E 1 1 1 - l 3 1 1 1 l I l I ~ l - - t t E i l l I I l ~ = 1 a a a m a a 6 - ~ - - - = a E = = = = = = - ~ ~ - a 6 = - E - = = O = n - = O = = = m - - a a - ~ E = = = = E ~ - =  
RLL COIlPRNI €5 5 -1 0 4 4 5 3 2 27 
................................................................................................ 
FERCENTRGE 18 1 5  U 1 5  15  18 11 8 1 0 0  
................................................................................................ 
ERRLY ROOPTERS 3 3 0 1 3 0 2 1 15 - 
------------__-____---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
PERCENTAGE 2 0  2 0  0 20 20 0 13 7 100 
The results show that the percentage of the early adopters is 
slightly higher than that of all companies? and that there is no 
indication that young companies (1952-1943) are more innovative 
than older ones. The exception is the period 1893-1902. Not one 
of the 5 companies established during those years belongs to the 
group of early adopters. We have no logical explanation for this 
phenomenon. For the earliest period (1873-1882), the percentage 
of early adopters is slightly lower, but on the other hand the 
period contains one company (Alpine) from the "first wave." 
5 .  DISCUSSION 
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that the results achieved 
have been acquired from a very narrow sample of one innovation in 
steel-making technology, albeit one of the most significant and 
decisive industrial events during the last 35 years. I t  is neces- 
sary to evaluate the outcomes, bearing this in mind. All these 
facts should be considered prior to drawing concrete conclusions 
from the results. Furthermore, the relatively narrow data base 
also does not permit broad generalizations in formulating our 
conclusions. 
The main aim of this study was to verify the different hypotheses 
regarding the relationship between company size/age and innovative 
activity. Our research aimed to investigate the possible concrete 
implications of the results on management decision-making, espe- 
cially in the area of strategic management, as well. The idea 
was, in conjunction with the aims of the MTL activity and other 
recommendations, e.g. directions for further research done by 
Buzacott (1980), to analyze the optimal company size and age 
closely with regard to innovative activity. 
The aim of such findings is clear. These results can pave the 
way for better strategic decisions, not only on the company level. 
To specify the role of company size could be important, for exam- 
ple, for governmental policy, bank intervention, as well as for a 
company's own investment strategy and strategic management of 
innovation technology. Government as well as bank policy can 
differentiate their support of companies using, among others, the 
criteria of size and age. Governmental bodies and banks can use 
differentiating instruments such as direct R&D funding? condition- 
al repayment loans, cooperative research programs, pricing (in 
planned economies), high-risk loans, patent policies, tax deduc- 
tions, standards and regulations; education/training/re-training 
funding, and export credits in favor of those companies whose 
probability of innovative activity is higher. 
An analysis of the results of our study, a comparison of the 
results of the first and second steps (Tables 3 and 4 ) ~  and espe- 
cially the results of the second step show most clearly that the 
most innovative group in the case of BOF adoption was the group of 
large companies, twice as high as the groups of small and medium 
companies. The results partially prove Wilson's theory and the 
conclusions of the IIASA workshop (1979) "Size and Productive 
Efficiency: The Wider Implications" in that the optimal size 
lies somewhere between the two outer extremes. But in our case, 
it is very important to recognize that the take-off phase of the 
technological life cycle was started by the small companies. On 
the other hand? we also see the complete lack of early innova- 
tiveness on the part of the mammoth companies. These are the 
facts which must be taken into consideration in strategic deci- 
sion-making. 
1 I 
A further fact must also be considered. The above mentioned 
conclusions are made up for the take-off phase of the technolo- 
gical life cycle. In the following phases, the situation could be 
!and most probably is) very different. So government, bank and 
company strategic policy must take into account size as a factor 
of time (the different phases of the technological life cycle) as 
well. 
Our results have not yet proven the other hypothesis (see Table 
7) that young companies are more innovative than older ones. But 
another most important result arises from our investigation. The 
size and age of companies is usually studied from a global point 
of view, but strategic policy usually functions on the company or 
country level (the steel industry is not a typical case of multi- 
national companies). 
The first conceptual problem is that one company may belong to 
the group of small firms from a global point of view, and at the 
same represent the largest company in its own country (Alpine in 
Austria, Belgo-Mineira in Brazil, etc.). More than this concep- 
tual problem, a crucial challenge arises. Many of the small and 
medium size countries (Austria, Netherlands, Norway) or large 
countries with less developed steel industry (Australia, Brazil) 
had no choice as to which firm to support, because in these coun- 
tries only 1 or at the most 2 companies had the capability to 
adopt BOF. So, for this size or type of country, the results have 
primarily a methodological significance for application in other 
branches of industry, where the number of companies of different 
sizes is higher. 
Comparing size with certain other factors influencing strategic 
decision-making in the adoption of BOF in some of the countries 
described in literature or in the MTL questionnaire, we make the 
following statements: 
In Austria, we can denote as the main factors environmental condi- 
tions and favorable technological preconditions. As an important 
environmental precondition, we can indicate the lack of steel on 
the national and world market during that period, lack of the 
necessary scrap supply and as technological prerequisite a nitro- 
gen-producing plant at that company (Voest) that generated oxygen 
as a by-product. The introduction of BOF promised to increase 
output of steel production together with decreasing scrap consump- 
tion. Moreover, no additional investments for a new oxygen gene- 
rating plant were necessary. Company size played a negligiable 
role in making this strategic decision. 
In the USA, the situation concerning the adoption of BOF was very 
complicated and we can agree with Lynn (1982) that it raises the 
notion of the so-called "garbage can" model, describing decision- 
making in "organized anarchies." The decision process is seen as 
a confluence of relatively independent streams of solutions, 
problems, choice opportunities and participants. Different au- 
thors present different reasons for the adoption, or rather the 
late adoption, of BOF by U.S. firms. 
Schenk (1974) assumes that there is a striking simularity between 
the diffusion of continuous casting and that of the BOF in the 
U.S. One of the reasons for the relatively late introduction of 
the BOF by large American steel plants seems to have been that i t  
took some time to develop a LD-converter of sufficient capacity. 
This is confirmed by Meyer and Herregat (1974) that by the end of 
1954, there were four plants worldwide using oxygen converters of 
the following capacity: two 30-ton vessels (Voest and Alpine, 
Austria), 35-ton vessel (Dofasco, Canada), and 35-ton vessel 
(McLouth, USA). But the results of our study show that this is 
only partially true (See Table 7) because large companies are the 
second most innovative group (60% of early adopters compared with 
50% of total number of large companies). 
Lynn (1982) sees the main reason for the late adoption of BOF, 
among others, in the negative role of the main suppliers. U.S. 
suppliers did not function as well in the promotion and develop- 
ment of BOF as, for example, those in Japan. The introduction of 
the BOF offered clear advantages to the steelmakers, but not 
necessarily to the suppliers. The refractories industry had to 
change their plants to produce refractories for the BOF's, but 
consumption fell substantially because BOF uses fewer refrac- 
tories than the open hearth method. The largest U.S. steel plant 
engineering firm had a heavy investment in open hearth technology 
and no reason to want to see a shift away from open hearths. In 
the U.S., there was no governmental body to promote the early 
adoption of BOF with financial and technical assistance. 
Ray (1984) is of the opinion that there is a minimum size for an 
economical BOF plant which is certainly considerably more than 
one million and probably around three million tons. But we must 
take into account that such a conclusion has been drawn for the 
maturity and declining phases of the BOF life cycle (late 1960's 
to the present) and has not been applied in take-off or growth 
phases. 
Buzacott (1980) stressed the economic climate and environment and 
drew the conclusion that it was "bad luck" for the U.S. steel 
industry that it expanded during the Korean War boom and hence 
had such a surplus capacity afterwards that major expansion of 
capacity was not required. 
From this survey of different factors influencing adoption of BOF 
in the U.S., we can see the great complexity of the analysis of 
management, especially strategic or innovation management. 
We can examine certain correlations between the adoption of BOF 
and that of continuous casting (See Figure 5), where 3 of 5 (60%) 
early adopters of BOF adopted continuous casting (CC) during the 
first phase in the U.S. (1963-1971). McLouth adopted CC in 1964, 
J&L in 1968, National in 1969. On the other hand, many late 
adopters of BOF adopted CC in this first stage as well, including 
"mammoth size" companies (U.S. Steel in 1967, Republic in 1968, 
and Bethlehem in 1970). 
Firms Adopting the CC i n  the U.S. 
1963-1971 
FIRM 
Roanoke 
H.K. Porter 
Roblin 
McLouth 
Armco 
Copperweld 
Florida 
Wickwire Brothers 
Soule 
Wisconsin 
U.S. Steel 
Tennessee For g i ng 
Borg Warner 
Etiwanda 
YEAR FIRM YEAR 
Lac lede 
North Star 
J & L  
Weirton 
Phoeni x 
Pol lak 
Republ ic 
Timker Roller Bearing 
National 
Nuc 1 ear 
Georgetown 
Bethlehem 
Inland 
Source: D. A. Muettner (1974) 
Figure 5 
A different situation analyzes production growth o f  early and 
late adopters o f  BOF for the period 1951-1965 (see Figure 6 ) .  
COMPANY 
Early Adopters: 
J L L  
National 
Kaiser 
C. F. & I. 
McLou t h 
TOTAL 
Late Adopters: 
U.S. Steel 
Bethlehem 
Repub 1 i c 
Young town 
Armco 
Inland 
Wheeling 
I I Sharon 
Crucible 
Pittsburgh 
TOTAL 
PRODUCTION PRODUCTION INDEX 
1951 ( m i l  t )  1965 (mil t )  65/51 
0.95 
1.32 
1.05 
1.35 
1.78 
1.69 
1.12 
0.60 
1.09 
1.40 
1.15 
Source: L. H. Lynn (1982) 
Figure 6 
From Figure 6, we discover that in the group of the early adop- 
ters, the maximum index is 3.75 (WcLouth, th,e first adapter in 
the U.S.) and the minimum is 1.00 (C.F. & I.). The average pro- 
duction growth index of this group is 1.69. 
In the group of late adopters, the maximum index is 1.78 (Armco) 
and the minimum is 0.60 (Sharon). The average production growth 
is 1.15. 
We see that the group of early adopters has better results com- 
pared with late adopters. The results could be further improved 
by the quality of management, but the main role is played by the 
use of a new BOF technology proven to be better than either Be- 
ssemer or Open Hearth. Only electric furnaces can compete with 
BOF, and that under very special conditions (e.9. small production 
volume, special grades of steel, low scrap and electric energy 
prices). But such evidence became known after the take-off phase 
of the BOF technological life cycle. 
The complicated conditions described above may have resulted in 
the decision of many small companies to adopt BOF, because the 
risk for them was not so high. Rosegger (1980) confirms that 
"expectations of cost advantages in the BOF plant alone would 
have constituted a thin reed on which to hang the commitment of a 
multi-million dollar investment." 
In Japan, one of the main reasons for such a broad early adoption 
of BOF is the role of government and governmental bodies, mainly 
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI! and sup- 
plying companies. MITI engineers strongly promoted the BOF and 
made sure that the information and experience gained by one firm 
was quickly available to all. As Lynn (1982) remarks, no com- 
parable role was played by any U.S. government agency. The com- 
panies in Japan were stronger in relation to their suppliers and 
were therefore able to take more initiative in technological 
changes. 
In Canada, the first adopter, Dofasco, found itself in the follow- 
ing situation in 1953: its open hearth capacity was being fully 
utilized and its blast furnace had surplus capacity (Buzacott, 
1980). In contrast to almost all U.S. companies, it had not 
expanded its steel-making facilities at the beginning of the 
Korean War rearmament boom in 1950-51. When BOF appeared, Dofasco 
was in the unique situation of requiring more steel-making capa- 
city and having the particular size, rate of growth, and produc- 
tion assortment for which the new process was ideal. 
In the USSR and other Eastern countries, the process of adopting 
BOF progressed more slowly. According to Marcus and Levy (1976), 
there are three main reasons for this lagging behind: 
* less rigourous pollution standards in many Eastern countries; 
* lack of the profit motive as an incentive when it came time 
to replace obsolete equipment; 
* inherent shortages of pig iron, while BOF requires a higher 
ratio of molden pig iron. 
Gccording to Buzacott (1980), the persistance and further develop- 
ment of the open hearth by the Soviet steel industry may have 
been due to their having large steel plants with absolute growth 
rates. There may have been a long delay until the niche for the 
introduction of BOF appeared. 
Aichinger, Hoffmann and Pittel (1981)  have estimated the develop- 
ment of steel-making processes through 2000 (see Figure 7 ) .  They 
prognosize that BOF in the year 2000 will be in prevalent use 
throughout the world. 
OXYGEN ELECTRIC OPEN HEARTH THOMAS, ETC. 
European Community 
1967 28 
1979/80 72 
2000 75 
North America 
1967 32 
1979/80 6 1 
2000 70 
Japan 
1967 67 
1979/80 7 6 
2000 80 
USSR & Eastern Countries 
1967 9 9 
1979/80 30 12 
2000 5 3 2 2 
World 
1967 27 
1979180 52 
2000 6 1 
Source: flichinger, Hoffmann, & Pittel, 1981 
Figure 7 
6 .  CONCLUSIONS 
A basic question could be raised in conclusion. When a technol- 
ogy is in the maturity or post-maturity phases (as BOF is at pre- 













